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Louisiana Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System v. Wynn

[A] body of men holding themselves accountable to nobody, ought not to be
trusted by any body.1

Since the burst of the high-tech bubble in the late 1990s, advancements in
corporate governance have often followed highly publicized failures in corporate
oversight and accountability.2 The popping of the tech bubble, the dramatic Enron
and WorldCom failures of the early 2000s, and the recession beginning in 2008
revealed major issues in corporate accountability, ushering in heightened compliance,
accounting, and auditing standards.3 Congress passed significant laws pertaining to
corporate governance reform in 2002 4 and 2010, 5 heightening standards and
establishing new duties of oversight for public company directors.6 With the hope of
rebuilding investor confidence, these acts sought to tighten corporate compliance
and strengthen risk management controls after scandal and reckless decisionmaking
led to massive losses for shareholders.7
Regulators quickly focused their attention on compliance controls to hold
corporations accountable for actions that damage the integrity of American industry.8
Investigations, enforcement actions, and settlements under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA)9 have risen dramatically since 2007, with record amounts of
dollars being paid in fines and dozens of punishments served.10 In 2010, the Securities
1.

Thomas Paine, Rights of Man: Being an Answer to Mr. Burke’s Attack on the French
Revolution 63 (Peter Eckler 1892) (1792).

2.

Grant Kirkpatrick, Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, OECD J.: Fin. Mkt. Trends,
no. 1, 2009, at 61, 63.

3.

Id.

4.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.) (“To protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate
disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes.”).

5.

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (“To promote the financial stability of
the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system [and] . . . to
protect consumers from abusive financial services practices . . . .”).

6.

See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale
L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005); Edolphus Towns, On the Dodd-Frank Act, 1 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. vii, vii–ix
(2011); J. Brent Wilkins, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Ripple Effects of Restoring Shareholder
Confidence, 29 S. Ill. U. L.J. 339, 340 (2005).

7.

See Romano, supra note 6, at 1538.

8.

Arthur F. Mathews, Defending SEC and DOJ FCPA Investigations and Conducting Related Corporate
Internal Investigations: The Triton Energy/Indonesia SEC Consent Decree Settlements, 18 Nw. J. Int’l L. &
Bus. 303, 305 (1998) (examining renewed interest in pursuing civil and criminal enforcement of the
FCPA).

9.

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (“To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to make it unlawful for
an issuer of securities . . . to make certain payments to foreign officials and other foreign persons . . . .”).

10.

Cherie O. Taylor, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Primer, Currents: Int’l Trade L.J., Winter
2008, at 3, 3.

268

N

VOLUME 60 | 2015/16

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

and Exchange Commission (SEC) successfully created a specialized unit to combat
multinational companies violating the FCPA.11
The heightened scrutiny and focus on compliance has influenced the market on
the grounds that certain companies are now less willing to engage in transactions
that would bring them under the FCPA’s jurisdiction.12 The mere disclosure of a
potential violation can send shareholders scrambling and stock prices plummeting.13
Too often, shareholders have seen their investments used to pay legal fees and settle
outrageous fines, instead of awarding dividends.14 Potential violations of the FCPA
not only put businesses at risk but also directly impact shareholders.
Unfortunately, shareholders have limited options in holding directors accountable.
Shareholder derivative litigation is a mechanism that allows the court to serve as a
forum for shareholders seeking to hold directors responsible for alleged harm to the
corporation.15 Shareholders file suit and step into the shoes of the corporation against
the board or adverse actor.16 Proceeds of a successful action are awarded back to the
corporation instead of the shareholders as a means of enforcing fiduciary obligations.17
Because this form of legal action brings business decisions into the courthouse,
plaintiffs in shareholder derivative litigation face many hurdles, including the “demand”
requirement under Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.18 This rule
requires shareholders to state whether they made a demand for action prior to filing
suit,19 or more commonly, why making such a demand prior to litigation would have
been futile or ineffective (“demand futility”).20 Plaintiffs who fail to establish a prior
11.

SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Commission, https://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last modified Oct. 5, 2015).

12.

N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Int’l Bus. Transactions, The FCPA and its Impact on
International Business Transactions—Should Anything Be Done to Minimize the
Consequences of the U.S.’s Unique Position on Combating Offshore Corruption? 1 (2011),
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/FCPAImpactonInternationalBusinessTransactions.pdf.

13.

See H. David Kotz & Susan M. Mangiero, Avoiding FCPA Liability by Tightening Internal
Controls 1–2 (2014), http://www.thinkbrg.com/media/publication/494_Kotz_Mangiero_CorpCounselor_
Sept2014_text.pdf.

14.

See id.; Baker Hughes Incorporated and Roy Fearnley: Lit. Rel. No. 20094, U.S. Sec. & Exchange
Commission (April 26, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20094.htm (discussing
the amount of fines that Baker Hughes must pay for violations of FCPA); Baker Hughes Inc., Quarterly
Report (Form 10-Q ) 13, 21 (July 30, 2007) (discussing the fine charges against Baker Hughes and the
reduction of the dividend because of lower cash on hand).

15.

Deborah A. DeMott & David F. Cavers, Shareholder Derivative Actions: Law and
Practice § 1:1 (2014–2015).

16.

Jeffrey D. Bauman & Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., Corporations Law and Policy: Materials
and Problems 705 (8th ed. 2013).

17.

See Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 Harv. L. Rev.
746 (1960).

18.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.

19.

Id. at 23.1(b)(3)(A).

20. Id. at 23.1(b)(3)(B).
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demand for action or demand futility in the complaint are barred from bringing a
claim.21 Most commonly, a demand for action can be established by raising the issue at
a shareholders meeting, sending a demand letter to the board, or following any
procedure for demand that may be included in the charter of the corporation. Proving
demand futility presents an ever-increasing burden on the shareholders, leaving many
investors locked out of both the boardroom and the courthouse.
In order to pass this initial hurdle under Rule 23.1, Nevada courts apply the legal
standard from Aronson v. Lewis.22 Plaintiffs may show demand futility either (1) by
stating with particularity facts showing that the directors are not independent in
their duties or disinterested in the transaction or (2) by rebutting the presumption
that the transaction was a valid exercise of business judgment.23 For the second prong
of Aronson—the business judgment rule presumption—the plaintiffs at the pleading
stage must allege “facts sufficient to raise (1) a reason to doubt that the action was
taken honestly and in good faith or (2) a reason to doubt that the board was adequately
informed in making the decision.”24
In Louisiana Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System v. Wynn, the District
Court for the District of Nevada examined whether a group of Wynn Resorts
shareholders, consisting mostly of pension and retirement funds, could bring a
derivative action against the directors of Wynn Resorts for approving a corporate
donation that carried a significant compliance risk. 25 The court, in granting the
defendants’ motion to dismiss, held that the plaintiffs did not meet the heightened
pleading standard to create a reasonable doubt as to the underlying transaction and
failed to rebut the business judgment rule presumption.26
This case comment contends that the Wynn court’s interpretation of the business
judgment rule presumption improperly bars shareholders from redress within the
courthouse and the boardroom for two reasons. First, the court applied an improperly
narrow analysis of the good faith element of the business judgment rule presumption.
Second, the court severely weakened the duty of directors to act on an informed
basis. The court’s ruling in Wynn sets an unclear precedent that harms corporate
21.

Andrew S. Hirsch, Dismissing Derivative Actions in the Federal Courts for Failure to Allege Demand
Futility: Choosing a Standard of Appellate Review—Abuse of Discretion or De Novo?, 64 Emory L.J. 201,
203 (2014).

22. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 2000). The Nevada Supreme Court has stated “[t]he Delaware court’s approach is a

well-reasoned method for analyzing demand futility and is highly applicable in the context of Nevada’s
corporations law.” Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 137 P.3d 1171, 1184 (Nev. 2006) (following Aronson,
473 A.2d at 812); see also In re Amerco Derivative Litig., 252 P.3d 681 (Nev. 2011).

23. In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S’holder Litig., 906 A.2d 808, 820 (Del. Ch. 2005). “These prongs are

in the disjunctive, and therefore, ‘if either prong is satisfied, demand is excused.’” La. Mun. Police
Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CV-509 JCM (GWF), 2014 WL 994616, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 13,
2014) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 254, 256 (Del. 2000)).

24.

In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. Ch. 2003).

25.

2014 WL 994616, at *1.

26. Id. at *9.
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governance reform and diminishes shareholders’ ability to hold directors accountable
for risky behavior.
The history of Macau, and the growth of its gaming industry, is crucial to
understanding the transaction at the heart of Wynn. In 1999, the People’s Republic of
China assumed formal sovereignty over Macau.27 Along with Hong Kong, Macau
was established as a Special Administrative Region in which the Chinese government
granted special economic rules and policies to foster growth.28 Macau quickly began
constructing new hotels and attractions as a way of building tourism. 29 Shortly
thereafter, casino magnates and corporations, including Wynn Resorts, descended on
Macau with the intention of creating the Las Vegas of the East.30 Wynn Resorts is led
by business mogul Stephen A. Wynn (“S. Wynn”),31 who has been called the “King of
Las Vegas”32 for his work in building one of the world’s largest casino, hospitality, and
tourism groups. 33 In 2006, Wynn Resorts opened the doors to its first hotel and
casino in Macau under a land concession agreement provided by the Macau
government.34 After opening the first casino, the company announced that it had
submitted an application with the Macau government for a second land concession
agreement.35 This time, Wynn Resorts planned to build a new casino resort on the
27.

Macau Handover: Asia’s Last Colony, BBC News (Dec. 20, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/564984.stm.

28. Joe Havely, What Now for Macau? BBC News (Dec. 20, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-

pacific/566074.stm.

29. Macao Gaming History, Gaming Inspection & Coordination Bureau, Macao, http://www.dicj.gov.

mo/web/en/history/index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).

30. Macau had always been friendly to the gambling industry, but under new rule, the dream of building a

true “Vegas of the East” to serve the Asian market became a reality. See id.

31.

Stephen A. Wynn is Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Wynn Resorts. The
company’s corporate profile provides that:
[p]rior to founding Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn was Chairman of the Board, President
and Chief Executive Officer of Mirage Resorts, Incorporated and its predecessor from
1973 to 2000. In that role, he was responsible for the development of Bellagio, The
Mirage, Treasure Island at The Mirage and the Golden Nugget in Las Vegas, Nevada
as well as the Atlantic City Golden Nugget in New Jersey and Beau Rivage in Biloxi,
Mississippi.

Corporate Profile, Wynn Resorts, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=132059&p=irolhomeProfile&t=&id=& (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
32.

This title has been used, for both good and bad, in biographies, e.g., John L. Smith, Running Scared:
The Life and Treacherous Times of Las Vegas Casino King Steve Wynn 21–22 (2001), general
publications, e.g., Nina Munk, Steve Wynn’s Biggest Gamble, Vanity Fair, June 2005, http://www.
vanityfair.com/society/features/2005/06/steve-wynn-las-vegas-resort, and profiles, e.g., 60 Minutes
(CBS television broadcast Apr. 12, 2009).

33. Munk, supra note 32.
34. La. Mun. Police Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CV-509 JCM (GWF), 2014 WL 994616, at *1 (D.

Nev. Mar. 13, 2014). A land concession agreement is used by a government or local authority to transfer
rights to a new entity, such as a corporation.

35.

Id.
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lucrative Cotai Strip. 36 The new development would be twice the size of Wynn
Resorts’ first Macau casino and located in a highly competitive area where rival
investment groups build resorts to outperform the success of the Las Vegas Strip.37
After five years of waiting on the application, the company had still not received
approval for the multi-billion dollar development on the Cotai Strip. 38 In 2011,
eleven of the twelve members of Wynn Resorts’ board of directors approved an
unprecedented $135 million donation to the University of Macau’s development
foundation. 39 The donation consisted of a $25 million charitable transfer made
immediately, and a commitment to make additional transfers of $10 million per year
from 2012 to 2022.40 The donation amounted to approximately seventy per cent of
the University’s endowment.41 Conveniently for Wynn Resorts, the University of
Macau’s chancellor also held the highest seat of power in the Macau government.42 A
month after announcing the donation, the Macau government finally approved the
second land concession agreement.43 At the time of the donation, only S. Wynn
sought a legal opinion sanctioning the transaction; no other board members sought
legal counsel leading up to the decision.44 The only board member who voted against
the transaction was Wynn Resorts’ co-founder, Kazuo Okada, who requested to see
the legal opinion45 but was shortly removed from the board as an “unsuitable
shareholder” following his disapproval of the pledged donation.46
36. See Vinicy Chan, Wynn Macau Gets Land Grant for Casino on Cotai Strip, Bloomberg Bus. (May 2,

2012, 5:59 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-02/wynn-macau-gets-land-approval-forcasino-on-cotai-gambling-strip.html. The Cotai Strip is an area of land adjacent to the designated area
where the first casinos were built following the handover. However, the Cotai Strip better resembles the
Las Vegas Strip because of the ability to walk between resorts freely in a seemingly isolated ecosystem.
Id.

37.

See id.

38. Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *1.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41.

Verified First Amended Consolidated Derivative Complaint ¶ 6, La. Mun. Police Emps’. Ret. Sys. v.
Wynn, No. 212-cv-00509 JCM (GWF), 2014 WL 994616 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2014), 2013 WL 3328279
[hereinafter Verified Complaint].

42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44. Id. ¶ 159; see also Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *9.
45.

Verified Complaint, supra note 41, ¶ 159; Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *1–2.

46. Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *2. Despite Okada’s help in co-founding Wynn Resorts with S. Wynn and

helping secure the success of the company’s prior casinos and resorts, this case comment will not
examine the continued battle between Okada, Wynn Resorts, and S. Wynn. Okada helped found
Wynn Resorts by financing S. Wynn’s operations following his departure from Mirage Resorts. The
court in Wynn declared that the board’s decision to oust Okada as an unsuitable shareholder was within
the board’s power as governed by the company’s Articles of Incorporation. Id. at *9. This led to a drastic
falling out between Wynn Resorts and Okada. See Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Ripples,
3 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 391, 446–49 (2014).
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In February 2012, the SEC’s Enforcement Division notified Wynn Resorts that
it had begun an informal inquiry into the Macau donation.47 The SEC has the
authority to investigate publicly traded companies for activities that potentially harm
investors.48 In February 2013, the Nevada Gaming Control Board announced its
own investigation into the donation but found no violations at the time.49
In March 2012, shortly after the SEC announced its investigation, a group of
Wynn Resorts shareholders brought a derivative suit against the eleven directors who
voted to approve the donation.50 The shareholders alleged breach of fiduciary duty,
waste of corporate assets, and unjust enrichment, and sought a permanent injunction
against the board for its approval of the donation.51 The plaintiffs’ theory of the case
alleged that the Macau donation represented an improper attempt to influence the
Macau government to speed up approval of the second land concession agreement,
which had been pending for five years.52 The defendants first moved to dismiss in
September 2012;53 the court granted this motion as well as the plaintiffs’ motion to
amend the complaint.54 The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint in
May 2013.55 After deliberations, the District Court for the District of Nevada, Judge
James Mahan presiding, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice.56
The judgment in favor of defendants was entered on March 13, 2014.
The court in Wynn improperly narrowed the business judgment rule presumption
as applied in a shareholder derivative suit in two ways. First, the court failed to
properly examine the good faith element. Second, the court severely weakened the
duty of directors to act on an informed basis. The court’s ruling weakens corporate
governance reform by undermining the importance of compliance and reduces the
shareholders’ ability to hold directors accountable.
First, the court’s analysis of the good faith element was improperly demanding
and will lead to dangerous results for shareholders. In order to rebut the business
47.

Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *1.

48. Investor Bulletin: SEC Investigations, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Commission (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.

sec.gov/enforce/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_investigations.html#.VN4eM7dOVl8.

49. Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *1.
50. The eleven director defendants who voted to approve the transaction are as follows: S. Wynn, Linda

Chen, Russell Goldsmith, Ray R. Irani, Robert J. Miller, John A. Moran, Mark D. Schorr, Alvin V.
Shoemaker, D. Boone Wayson, Elaine P. Wynn, and Allen Zeman. Id.

51.

Id. at *2.

52.

Id. at *1.

53.

Motion to Dismiss, La. Mun. Police Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-cv-509 JCM (GWF), 2014
WL 994616 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2014), 2012 WL 7987171.

54. La. Mun. Police Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CV-509 JCM (GWF), 2013 WL 431339 (D. Nev.

Feb. 1, 2013).

55.

Motion to Dismiss First Amended Consolidated Derivative Complaint, La. Mun. Police Emps’. Ret.
Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CV-509 JCM (GWF), 2014 WL 994616 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2014), 2013 WL
9744135.

56. Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *9.
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judgment rule presumption, plaintiffs must allege, with sufficient facts, a reason to
doubt that the action was made honestly and in good faith.57 The court must identify
whether the plaintiff has articulated a reasonable basis to be entrusted with a claim
that belongs to the corporation before the plaintiff can proceed with discovery and
trial, if necessary.58 The court in Wynn, however, stated that “[a]t most, the [plaintiffs’]
complaint alleges that defendants knew the donation was made in an effort to obtain
the land concession” but that “this does not demonstrate bad faith on behalf of the
directors.”59 The court held that the business judgment rule presumption protected
the directors because the plaintiffs had not alleged that “the donation was made to
advance some interest other than the company’s welfare or that the directors had
knowledge of the violation of the law.”60 This ruling not only goes against prior case
law but also undercuts the duty upon directors to act in good faith.
The District Court should have analyzed the good faith element under the
precedent established in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation 61
because the directors failed to exercise a reasonable effort to monitor compliance
risk.62 In Caremark, the Delaware Court of Chancery stated that the failure of a
board to exercise compliance oversight will establish a lack of necessary good faith
and rebut the business judgment rule presumption.63 In Wynn, the Macau donation
was not a business transaction in the traditional sense because it was a corporate
donation bearing significant risk of violating the FCPA and the board’s fiduciary
duties to shareholders.64 Accordingly, the plaintiffs asserted that the directors
breached their fiduciary duties of oversight, care, and loyalty by approving the
donation at the expense of compliance with the law.65
Stone v. Ritter, one of Caremark’s progeny, further established the relationship
between a director’s duty of oversight and the good faith requirement.66 In Stone, the
Delaware Supreme Court examined a derivative action brought against a bank for its
57.

In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. Ch. 2003).

58. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000) (holding that shareholder claims at the pleading

stage must demonstrate particularized facts and be “simple, concise and direct”).

59.

Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *8.

60. Id.
61.

698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk
Management, 34 Iowa J. Corp. L. 967, 968 (2009) (“Shareholder suits bringing such claims principally
implicate the analysis of oversight failures by the board of directors, as established by the Caremark
decision and its progeny.”).

62. See Gabriela Jara, Note, Following on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Dynamic Shareholder

Derivative Suit, 63 Duke L.J. 199, 203 (2013) (“The liability underlying an FCPA follow-on derivative
suit is premised on a Caremark claim.”); see also Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.

63. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
64. See Jara, supra note 62, 205–07.
65.

See Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *2, *8.

66. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
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failure to maintain a compliance program to oversee money-laundering violations.67
The Stone court recognized that good faith, in the context of the duty of oversight,
requires a reasonable effort by the directors to steer clear of “red flags” that would
alert their attention to particular forms of risk.68
The defendants in Wynn were faced with many red flags which would support a
reasonable inference of a compliance risk.69 First, given the recent trends in U.S.
enforcement efforts, no company conducting business abroad can afford to ignore the
FCPA or the duty of directors in implementing effective compliance oversight.70
Delaware courts regularly analyze the good faith element within the context of the
company’s industry.71 The casino and gaming industry has long been scrutinized for
its connections to money laundering, organized crime, corruption, and bribery.72 At
the time the board made its decision, it was also likely on notice that the company’s
biggest competitor, the Las Vegas Sands, was being investigated for similar FCPA
violations in Macau.73 Beyond the industry, the Wynn court neglected to examine
factors that past courts have used to establish reasonable doubt. These include not
only examining the transaction in the context of the defendant’s industry, but also
examining the size, timing, and probable harm that the transaction might cause to
shareholders.
In Metro Communication Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Technologies, Inc., the
Delaware Chancery Court held that a plan to bribe foreign officials in order to
obtain permits constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.74 The bribe was in connection
with the then-recently deregulated Brazilian telecommunications industry.75 Roughly
$31 million in payments were made through a bribery scheme that would grant the
67.

Id. at 365.

68. See id. at 373.
69. See Bainbridge, supra note 61, at 988 (“[R]ed flags involving illegal behavior or accounting irregularities

are more likely to result in liability than risk management failures.”); see also In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder
Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“There are significant differences between
failing to oversee employee fraudulent or criminal conduct and failing to recognize the extent of a
Company’s business risk.”).

70. Taylor, supra note 10, at 3.
71.

See, e.g., In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 5430–VCS., 2011 WL 2176479, at *29 (Del. Ch. May 31,
2011).

72. See Fin. Action Task Force, Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector (March 2009),

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Vulnerabilities%20of%20Casinos%20and%20
Gaming%20Sector.pdf.

73. See, e.g., Joel Rosenblatt, Las Vegas Sands, Adelson Face $5 Billion Macau Plan Suit, Bloomberg Bus.

(July 13, 2014, 1:39 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-11/las-vegas-sands-sued-for-5billion-over-trade-secrets.html (detailing litigation concerning corruption in Macau tied to Las Vegas
Sands for activities that were highly scrutinized amongst regulators, industry insiders, and anxious
shareholders).

74.

854 A.2d 121, 131 (Del. Ch. 2004).

75. Id. at 129–30.
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defendants work authorizations for certain employees in Brazil.76 The scandal was
uncovered by the local media and led to an investigation by the Department of Justice
(DOJ) under the FCPA.77 The court looked to relevant factors such as the industry
and the size and timing of the transactions in determining that the defendants
breached their fiduciary duty by pursuing work authorizations at the expense of
compliance with the law.78
Additionally, in In re Massey Energy Co., shareholders of a controversial coal
mining corporation brought a claim against the directors for failing to make a good
faith effort to comply with mine safety regulations.79 Shareholders brought the suit
following a mine explosion in West Virginia that killed twenty-nine workers and
injured many others.80 The court applied intense scrutiny to the directors’ decisions
based primarily on the industry in which the company operated. 81 The court
recognized the plaintiffs’ argument that the coal mining company pursued profits at
the expense of compliance with the law.82
The Wynn court should have taken into account both the timing of the transaction
and its unprecedented size as relevant factors. Perhaps the most suspicious element of
the donation was that it came at a crucial time in the application process and led to
the approval of the land concession by the Macau government two months later.83
The size of the donation raises doubt as it amounted to approximately seventy per cent
of the university’s endowment, an unprecedented figure in the history of both Wynn
Resorts and the university.84 Furthermore, the court should have scrutinized the
transaction more closely because of the high-risk nature of the gambling industry in
Macau.85 Much like the coal mining industry in Massey, the gambling industry has a

76. Id.
77.

Id. at 130, 135.

78. See id. at 132–37.
79. C.A. No. 5430–VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *19 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011).
80. Id. at *1.
81.

See id. at *19–21.

82. Id.
83. La. Mun. Police Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CV-509 JCM (GWF), 2014 WL 994616, at *8 (D.

Nev. Mar. 13, 2014).

84. Verified Complaint, supra note 41, ¶ 6.
85. The gambling industry in Macau has long been tainted and scrutinized as a playground for corruption.

See, e.g., Vinicy Chan, Macau Casinos Decline After Report on Junket Crackdown, Bloomberg Bus. (Feb.
6, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-06/galaxy-leads-macau-casino-drop-on-reportof-junket-curbs.html (discussing corruption in Macau tied to the gaming industry); Kate O’Keeffe,
Wary High-Rollers Shy Away From Macau’s Casinos, Wall St. J. (Aug. 1, 2014, 2:02 PM), http://online.
wsj.com/articles/macau-gambling-revenue-drops-again-1406871798; cf. Jorge Godinho, Casino Gaming
in Macau: Evolution, Regulation and Challenges, 5 UNLV Gaming L.J. 1 (2014) (discussing current
problems in Macau and changes implemented by the Macau and Chinese governments to tackle issues
moving forward); Rosenblatt, supra note 73.

276

N

VOLUME 60 | 2015/16

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

well-known history of corruption, bribery, and organized crime.86 Likewise, the
directors acted similarly to the board in Massey by exposing the company to significant
compliance risks in the pursuit of profits. The board’s failure to minimize exposure to
regulatory risk harmed both the corporation and its shareholders and created a valid
reason to doubt that the action was made in good faith.
Additionally, the Wynn court failed to incorporate the then-ongoing investigations
as a factor that might rebut the business judgment rule presumption. When examining
the plausibility of the plaintiff ’s allegations, many courts have stated that a pending
government investigation into alleged misconduct supports the inference that the
defendants acted with knowledge that their decision was wrongful.87 Past precedent
has included inquiries and investigations by the SEC and similar regulators.88 The
court’s refusal to weigh the then-ongoing investigations by the SEC, DOJ, and
Nevada gaming authorities not only goes against precedent but also serves to
undermine the work of these agencies in protecting shareholders. The court should
have incorporated the then-ongoing investigations as a factor in favor of the plaintiffs’
claims that the decision was not a valid exercise of business judgment.
Furthermore, the court ultimately failed to properly analyze the good faith
element of the directors’ decision that was approved at the expense of compliance
with the law. The Wynn court stated that the defendants did not act in bad faith by
approving the donation as an effort to obtain the land concession.89 The court stated
that the plaintiffs were unable to meet their burden to rebut the presumption absent
a showing that the donation was made to advance some interest other than the
company’s welfare.90
In Wynn, the directors’ decision was not a bona fide charitable donation because
it was made in the interests of obtaining the second land concession agreement with
no regard for legal consequences. The court did not examine the fact that the
donation was not intended to serve as an actual donation. Charitable donations have
a long history of masking money laundering, corruption, and bribery.91 The court’s
acceptance of the company’s effort to further business motives in a foreign country
leaves the floodgates wide open for transactions that potentially violate duties and
86. See Massey, 2011 WL 2176479, at *18.
87.

See In re Lernout & Hauspice Sec. Litig. v. Lernout, 230 F. Supp. 2d 152, 165–68 (D. Mass. 2002)
(finding that an informal inquiry by the SEC was a red flag supporting plaintiffs’ claims); In re Oxford
Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 51 F. Supp. 2d 290, 293, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that an
investigation by the New York Attorney General was a red flag supporting plaintiffs’ complaint); In re
Health Mgmt. Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that an SEC inquiry
constituted one of multiple important red flags).

88. See In re Lernout, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 165; In re Oxford, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 295; In re Health Mgmt., 970

F. Supp. at 203.

89. La. Mun. Police Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CV-509 JCM (GWF), 2014 WL 994616, at *8 (D.

Nev. Mar. 13, 2014).

90. Id.
91.

See Reagan R. Demas, Biting the Hands That Feed: Corporate Charity and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 29 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 335 (2014).
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statutes—so long as an underlying motive tied to profits exists. Directors cannot be
said to act in good faith when they pursue profits at the cost of wading into
complicated regulatory territory because they run counter to the “long run interests
of shareholders.” 92 The court’s interpretation fails to consider the shareholders’
reasonable belief that the donation was not made in good faith because it was used to
curry favor for the second land concession.
In Massey, the court stated that pursuing profits at the expense of compliance
with the law harmed the corporation and its shareholders by exposing them to legal
costs, fines, and punishments.93 The Wynn decision resulted in “the cost of defending
Wynn Resorts against government investigations and the penalties, fines and other
liabilities and expenses associated with those investigations.” 94 The court’s finding
that a donation used to curry favor with a foreign government falls within the
company’s best interest undermined the role of compliance in maintaining the
integrity of an American business. The court’s analysis of the good faith element
substantially weakened the shareholders’ ability to bring an action against directors
for exposing the company to significant compliance risk.
Second, the Wynn court set a precedent which drastically reduces the duty of
directors to make decisions on an informed basis. The Wynn court ruled that the
plaintiffs were unsuccessful in alleging that the directors failed to act on an informed
basis for three reasons: (1) the plaintiffs did not allege that informative materials were
readily available to board members; (2) other board members did not know about S.
Wynn’s legal opinion; and (3) S. Wynn’s legal opinion supported the donation.95 The
court’s reasoning, however, was flawed for three reasons: (1) if S. Wynn thought it
reasonable to seek a legal opinion, then such material information was reasonably
available to the other directors; (2) S. Wynn’s legal opinion should have been shared
with the other directors regardless of its substance; and (3) the court should not have
weighed the substance of the opinion against the plaintiffs’ complaint.
S. Wynn likely thought it reasonable to seek a legal opinion because the gambling
industry is not immune from strict treatment and examination by regulators96 and
such opinion would likely help determine the board’s course of action. Corruption
and bribery have long been entangled with the casino industry.97 With the persistent
monitoring by various governmental regulators, 98 it is reasonable to expect that as a
92. Leo E. Strine, Jr. et. al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98

Geo L.J. 629, 651 n.68 (2010) (quoting TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., C.A. Nos. 10427,
10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989)) (describing the duty that requires directors to
attempt to “manage the corporation within the law, with due care and in a way intended to maximize
the long run interests of shareholders”); see also Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015).

93. In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 5430–VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *20–21 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011).
94. Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *1.
95. See id. at *8–9.
96. See Godinho, supra note 85, at 5–7.
97.

See id. at 14–22.

98. See id.
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director, S. Wynn would seek a legal opinion which validates the transfer of money
because of the regulatory requirements that follow casino operators.
The board members’ approval of the donation without counsel constitutes a
breach of duty because the FCPA requires companies to have a system in place to
examine such a risk.99 A duty to act independently on an informed basis is instilled
in every director.100 Delaware courts have repeatedly held that directors are required
to act in an informed and deliberate manner.101 The Wynn court, however, only
required informative material provided to the board to be considered.102 This standard
is unacceptably low for directors and fails to adequately ref lect advancements in
corporate governance reform that require greater diligence.
While directors need not examine every minute detail of a transaction before its
approval, seeking readily available counsel so they can become aware of the regulatory
and compliance issues would fulfill directors’ obligations to corporations and
shareholders. Today, interpretation and enforcement of the FCPA is so broad that it
results in “the largest proportion of pre-trial agreements with government
enforcement officials.”103 That the directors did not seek out S. Wynn’s legal opinion
or any legal counsel for themselves should constitute a failure to act on an informed
basis. Thus, the plaintiffs’ allegations should rebut the business judgment rule
presumption as the board members’ failure to adequately inform themselves greatly
harmed the corporation and its shareholders.
S. Wynn’s legal opinion also should have been shared with the other directors at
the time the transaction was approved regardless of its substance. The court weakened
the fiduciary duty of care and oversight by stating that legal counsel was not necessary
because it may not impact the rest of the board’s decision. The duty to act on an
informed basis is purely a procedural mechanism.104 The business judgment rule
protects misinformed, mistaken, or misguided decisions so long as directors seek
information that is reasonably available.105 If judges continue to hold directors to
differing standards, they will create an unclear fiduciary obligation and lead directors
to rely on information that was not independently obtained in a deliberate manner.
The court should also not have weighed the substance of the opinion against the
plaintiffs’ complaint. The Wynn court erred in holding that “plaintiffs have not stated
with sufficient particularity that seeking legal advice would have had an impact on the
99. Taylor, supra note 10, at 7 (“Given the breadth of the FCPA and its interpretation by the SEC, the DOJ

and the courts, all U.S. companies conducting business internationally must create and implement
compliance programs.”).

100. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 920 (Del. 2000).
101. Id. at 921; Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d

805, 812 (Del. 1984)).

102. La. Mun. Police Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CV-509 JCM (GWF), 2014 WL 994616, at *8 (D.

Nev. Mar. 13, 2014).

103. Taylor, supra note 10, at 8.
104. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
105. See id. at 259.
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board’s decision to approve the Macau donation.”106 The court’s accounting for the
substance of S. Wynn’s opinion cuts against the duty of directors to be informed and
goes against precedent107 and the intention of the business judgment rule
presumption.108 Directors have a duty to become informed whether such information
proves fruitful or not.109 S. Wynn had an obligation to share the legal opinion
regardless of its effect on the board’s decisionmaking. Taking into account the
opinion’s substance runs contrary to the interests of the business judgment rule
presumption and restricts shareholders’ ability to hold directors accountable. The
court’s ruling would require shareholders to prove at the pleading stage not only that
the directors failed to properly inform themselves, but also that the information
obtained would prove the plaintiff ’s allegations and rebut the business judgment rule
presumption.
Considering the damning effect of compliance violations in modern business
practice and the regulatory scrutiny of the gambling industry, the court should have
held the plaintiffs to a more equitable pleading standard. In line with advancements
in corporate governance reform, Wynn should have stood for the proposition that a
director cannot act on an informed basis without properly examining compliance
risk. Instead, the court created a precedent that will drastically reduce the duty of
directors to act on an informed basis.
Courts have increased the burden on plaintiff-shareholders to avoid wading
unnecessarily into the boardroom and to curb frivolous lawsuits that might disturb
everyday business matters.110 However, the District Court of Nevada’s holding in Wynn
entered new and perilous territory for shareholders that will have a chilling effect on
cases of merit. Enforcement of the FCPA will continue to evolve, and demand-futility
cases such as Wynn should encourage directors to understand their obligations and the
risks associated with the FCPA.111 Corporations going abroad will surely continue to
play an important role in developing the local communities in which they operate.112
106. Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *9 (emphasis added).
107. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 (“‘[S]ubstantive due care,’ . . . is foreign to the business judgment rule.

Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments. We do not even decide if they are
reasonable in this context. Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care only.”).

108. See id.; Solash v. Telex Corp., Civil Action Nos. 9518, 9528, 9525, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 7, at *21 (Del.

Ch. Jan. 19, 1988) (“Because businessmen and women are correctly perceived as possessing skills,
information, and judgment not possessed by reviewing courts . . . courts have long been reluctant to
second-guess such decisions . . . .”).

109. See R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Delaware Law of Corporations and Business

Organizations §4.19(A) n.1003 (2015).

110. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“The theory

here advanced is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope
to win a judgment.”); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of
Loyalty, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1769, 1777 (2007) (“Caremark duties are deliberately structured to make
it extremely hard for plaintiffs to win.”).

111. Jara, supra note 62, at 243.
112. Demas, supra note 91, at 336–37.
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Contributions such as the Macau donation in Wynn, however, clearly fall within FCPA
liability and could continue to pose a threat to shareholders in a changing statutory
landscape.113 Courts should not shy away from standing up for shareholders when a
board wades dangerously into the murky waters of the FCPA.
The Wynn court erred in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Courts
must properly evaluate board decisions that bear significant compliance risk in order
to uphold the rights of shareholders. The Wynn court’s ruling will narrow the options
available for shareholders to hold directors accountable because it places an
unconscionable burden on plaintiffs seeking to rebut the business judgment rule
presumption at the pleading stage. The Wynn court set a dangerous precedent by
diminishing the critical role of compliance in advancing corporate governance and
further steepening the hurdle for shareholders seeking to hold directors responsible
for harmful actions that burden the corporation with significant compliance risk.

113. See id. at 355.
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